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Salman v. United States:  
Insider Trading’s Tipping Point? 
Donna M. Nagy* 
The Supreme Court’s 2016 term officially begins on the first Monday in 
October. But corporate insiders, securities analysts, and professional traders (as 
well as securities lawyers and scholars) are focusing their attention on 
Wednesday, October 5, when the Court, for the first time in nearly two decades, 
will hear argument in an insider trading case. It has been even longer still since 
the Court—in its 1983 decision in Dirks v. SEC1—last grappled with the 
circumstances under which tipping and trading on stock tips constitute 
violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.   
I am honored to contribute to this important Symposium by setting the 
stage for the four Essays that follow. Jill Fisch (Pennsylvania), Donald 
Langevoort (Georgetown), Jonathan Macey (Yale), Adam Pritchard (Michigan), 
and I (Indiana University-Bloomington) have each been writing about insider 
trading law for two or three decades, and our views, expressed in both this 
Symposium and prior work, provide contrasting perspectives.  
We agree on several matters. First and foremost, each of us expects the 
Court in Salman v. United States2 to affirm the lower court’s decision upholding 
the petitioner’s securities fraud and conspiracy convictions for trading on the 
basis of stock tips. The tipper in Salman was an investment banker employed at 
Citigroup who, on multiple occasions, disclosed to his brother confidential 
information about upcoming mergers and acquisitions, knowing that his 
brother was using the information to profit in the securities market.3 The 
brother also passed the lucrative information to the petitioner, Bassam Salman, 
a family member by marriage, who traded on the tips knowing that the 
 
* C. Ben Dutton Professor of Law and Executive Associate Dean, Indiana University Maurer 
School of Law-Bloomington. I am grateful to the Symposium participants and Professors 
Hannah Buxbaum, Margaret Sachs, and Hillary Sale for their helpful comments on this 
Essay.  
 1. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 2. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016). 
 3. Id. at 1088-89.  
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information had been misappropriated from Citigroup and its clients.4 In his 
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Salman argued that his guilty verdict and three-year 
prison sentence were not supported by legally sufficient evidence because the 
investment banker had neither sought nor received a tangible benefit in 
exchange for gratuitously tipping his brother.5 The Ninth Circuit rejected that 
argument and held, correctly in our opinion, that proof of a tangible benefit is 
not required for joint tipper-tippee liability under Dirks, provided there is 
sufficient evidence of an intention on the part of the tipper to give entrusted 
information as a gift to a trading relative or friend.6 The Ninth Circuit thus 
created what is, at least arguably, a split with the Second Circuit’s controversial 
ruling in United States v. Newman.7 
The five of us also agree that the Court’s classical and misappropriation 
theories of insider trading fit awkwardly into a rubric of securities fraud under 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act8 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.9 These 
complementary theories of insider trading are predicated on the Court’s 
adaptation of fiduciary principles to Section 10(b)’s prohibition of deceptive 
devices and contrivances “in connection with the purchase and sale of a 
security.”10 The classical approach from Dirks and Chiarella v. United States11 is 
directed at a corporate insider’s deceptive silence in transactions with 
shareholders of the securities issuer. And the misappropriation approach from 
United States v. O’Hagan
12 is premised on an outsider’s deception of the source of 
the entrusted information. Both theories encompass a host of doctrinal 
“anomalies,”13 including (and perhaps particularly) Dirks’s notion that a tipper’s 
breach of fiduciary duty can somehow impute to the tip’s recipient a disclosure 
 
 4. Id. at 1089. 
 5. Id. at 1093.  
 6. Id. at 1093-94.  
 7. The Court granted a Writ of Certiorari on the first question presented in the Petition:   
Does the personal benefit to the insider that is necessary to establish insider trading under 
Dirks v. SEC require proof of “an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at 
least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature,” as the Second Circuit held 
in United States v. Newman, or is it enough that the insider and the tippee shared a close family 
relationship, as the Ninth Circuit held in this case? 
 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Salman, No. 15-628 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2015), 2015 WL 
7180648, at *i (citations omitted). 
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2015)). 
 9. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2015). 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 11. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 12. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 13. See Donald C. Langevoort, Setting the Agenda for Legislative Reform: Some Fallacies, 
Anomalies, and Other Curiosities in the Prevailing Law of Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L. REV. 
399, 403 (1988) (describing the “fiction of insider trading as fraud”).   
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obligation of “trust and confidence,” provided the tippee “knows or should know 
that there has been a breach.” 14 But in the absence of explicit statutory 
prohibitions against insider trading and tipping, and because silence absent a 
duty to disclose is not fraudulent,15 we recognize the value of the Court’s legal 
fictions.  
The tipper-tippee liability issue in Dirks presented a particularly nettlesome 
problem because tippees—such as the family members in Salman or the two 
hedge fund managers whose convictions were vacated in Newman16—are 
typically strangers to both the securities issuer’s shareholders and the source of 
the entrusted information. They are thus fiduciaries to neither shareholders nor 
sources in any real sense. Dirks created the “personal benefit” test to determine 
whether an insider’s disclosure of entrusted information breaches a fiduciary 
duty, which then renders a tippee with awareness of that breach a “participant” 
in the fiduciary’s fraud.17 The test, according to the Court, must focus on 
“objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit 
from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will 
translate into future earnings.”18 But Dirks likewise observed that “[t]he elements 
of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an 
insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”19 Thus, 
under Dirks’s personal benefit test, tippees assume a disclosure duty of trust and 
confidence to transacting shareholders (under the classical theory) or to the 
source of entrusted information (under the misappropriation theory) only when 
material nonpublic information “has been made available to them improperly.”20 
At issue in Dirks were nonpublic disclosures made to a securities analyst by 
corporate insiders, who did not act improperly because they “were motivated by 
a desire to expose” a massive ongoing fraud at the corporation.21 
The Court in Dirks eschewed the SEC’s broader reading of Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, fearing that it would have “an inhibiting influence on the role of 
market analysts.” 22As Pritchard observes from his review of initial drafts of the 
Dirks opinion, Justice Lewis Powell “wanted to leave space for securities 
professionals to uncover non-public information, even if it came from corporate 
 
 14. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983). 
 15. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (emphasizing the common law principle that “one who fails to 
disclose material information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud 
only when he is under a duty to do so”).  
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 47-48.  
 17. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659. 
 18. Id. at 663 (emphasis other than i.e. added). 
 19. Id. at 664 (emphasis added). 
 20. Id. at 660.   
 21. Id. at 667.  
 22. Id. at 656-58.  
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insiders.”23 Justice Powell had been confident that trading on the basis of 
selectively disclosed information would contribute to stock market pricing 
efficiency, which the Court concluded “redounds to the benefit of all 
investors.”24 
This Symposium’s consensus diverges when it comes to our opinions about 
how the Salman Court should evaluate its insider trading law precedents. Fisch, 
Macey, and Pritchard would like to see the Court strictly adhere to Dirks’s 
personal benefit test. I agree that the Court should reaffirm Dirks insofar as it 
held that only improper disclosures trigger joint tipper-tippee liability.25 But in 
my view, the Salman Court should instead employ the interpretive methodology 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg used in O’Hagan, construing Rule 10b-5 broadly to 
effectuate the congressional objectives of “insur[ing] honest securities markets 
and thereby promot[ing] investor confidence.”26 The Salman Court should 
likewise evaluate the investment banker’s gratuitous tips to his brother with a 
view to O’Hagan’s misappropriation doctrine. That is, regardless whether a 
fiduciary stands as an insider or outsider to the securities issuer, loyalty duties 
are breached—and frauds are perpetrated—whenever fiduciaries secretly make 
third-party disclosures that deprive principals of the “exclusive use” of entrusted 
information.27 Thus, O’Hagan supports a joint tipper-tippee liability test that 
turns on evidence of disclosures that violate a fiduciary’s duty of loyalty, 
whether or not the tipper acted self-servingly and sought or received a personal 
benefit in exchange for the information.28 Langevoort likewise questions why 
personal benefit should continue to play such an outsized role in Rule 10b-5 
liability determinations.29 
This Symposium also provides conflicting assessments of actions (and 
inactions) by Congress, the Court, and the SEC in the development of insider 
trading law. Pritchard, for instance, criticizes both the SEC, for pursuing a 
largely litigation-oriented “campaign against insider trading,” and Congress, for 
failing to “take responsibility for enacting criminal prohibitions” on insider 
 
 23. A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU L. REV. 857, 861 (2015). 
 24. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 n.17 (observing that “market efficiency in pricing is significantly 
enhanced by [analyst] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information”).  
 25. See Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. CORP. L. 1 
(forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2665820. 
 26. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (“[I]nvestors likely would hesitate to 
venture their capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic 
information is unchecked by law.”). 
 27. Id. at 652. 
 28. Nagy, supra note 25, at 61-66. 
 29. See Donald C. Langevoort, Informational Cronyism, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 37, 39 (2016) 
(contending that “there should be liability when an insider plays a corrupted Santa Claus 
with corporate secrets”).  
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trading.30 Yet, as I see it, Congress’s multiple determinations to forego a 
legislative definition evidence not abdication, but rather concerted judgments 
that fraud-based insider trading and tipping proscriptions—and the interstitial 
lawmaking inherent in such proscriptions—put securities traders on 
appropriate notice that transactions based on misappropriated information will 
be subject to stiff civil sanctions and harsh criminal penalties.31 Fisch similarly 
holds a favorable view of what she has elsewhere termed an insider trading 
“lawmaking partnership” among Congress, the Court, and the SEC.32  
Our differing opinions about the judiciary’s and the SEC's respective 
responsibilities for policy choices under the federal securities laws prompt 
particularly stark disagreements over the interplay between Rule 10b-5’s scope 
and Regulation FD,33 which effectively bans what the SEC regards as “unfair 
selective disclosure.”34 The SEC promulgated Regulation FD in 2000 as an “issuer 
disclosure rule” pursuant to its rulemaking power under Section 13(a) of the 
Exchange Act.35 The regulation, which seeks to create a more “level playing 
field” for all investors,36 prohibits issuer officials from selectively sharing 
unreleased earnings announcements and other material nonpublic information 
with securities analysts and other industry professionals.37  
Although it is clear that the SEC adopted Regulation FD to put an end to the 
privileged status analysts and their clients enjoyed in the wake of Dirks,38 the 
 
 30. A.C. Pritchard, The SEC and Insider Trading: A Sorry Tale of Administration Usurpation, 69 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 57, 63 (2016).  
 31. See Nagy, supra note 25, at 34-44 (discussing the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 
the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, and the Stop Trading 
on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012); id. at 32 & n.182 (differentiating the property-
based Rule 10b-5 fraud theory endorsed in O’Hagan from the due process concerns that 
prompted the honest-services fraud holding in Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 
(2010)). 
 32. See Jill E. Fisch, Federal Securities Fraud Litigation as a Lawmaking Partnership, 93 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 453, 469-70 (2015) (contending that insider trading “demonstrates the 
advantages of the lawmaking partnership as a tool to develop financial regulation,” id. at 
483).  
 33. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100-243.103 (2015).  
 34. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, [2000 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319 at 83,680 (Aug. 15, 2000) [hereinafter 
Selective Disclosure Release]. 
 35. Id. at 83,666.  
 36. Id. at 83,677.  
 37. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101.  
 38. See Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. 
REV. 1023, 1024 (1990) (observing that insiders’ disclosures to analysts typically were not 
unlawful after Dirks because they served a variety of corporate ends “such as to enhance 
the company’s standing with the investor community or to strengthen pre-existing lines 
of communication”). 
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authors of this Symposium hold decidedly different views as to which policy 
preferences—the SEC’s or the Dirks majority’s—should be accorded greater 
weight in deciding when tipping selectively disclosed information and trading 
on the basis of those tips constitute securities fraud.39 Dirks’s policy rationale is 
predicated on an empirical claim that some selective disclosures by insiders to 
analysts are overall a positive force in securities markets.40 It is hardly surprising 
that our views differ not only on how to weigh the SEC’s contrary claim 
(reflected in its adoption of Regulation FD after notice and comment),41 but also 
on how to regard post-Regulation FD evidence that supports the SEC’s 
contentions.42 We likewise disagree as to whether insiders who cause issuers to 
violate Regulation FD and/or flagrantly contravene issuers’ compliance 
procedures pertaining to market-sensitive information can ever be regarded 
under Rule 10b-5 as acting “benignly” for legitimate corporate purposes.43 As I 
have argued, insiders who deliberately leak information in violation of 
Regulation FD have failed to act in good faith and thereby breach their duty of 
 
 39. Compare Jonathan R. Macey, The Genius of the Personal Benefit Test, 69 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 64, 69 (2016) (arguing that in Rule 10b-5 insider trading cases, courts should 
continue to defer to Dirks’s view of salutary selective disclosure but acknowledging that 
Dirks “explicitly condoned”  the selective disclosure practices that “the SEC made illegal” 
seventeen years later in Regulation FD), with Langevoort, supra note 29, at 43 (explaining 
that Regulation FD “took direct aim at the kind of selective disclosure to analysts that 
Justice Powell (naively, I think) had treated as an unqualified good”). See also Nagy, supra 
note 25, at 53 n.307 (raising, but leaving unresolved, the application of administrative 
law principles in decisions including Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 
837 (1984)).  
 40. See supra text accompanying notes 22, 24 (quoting Dirks); see also Macey, supra note 39, at 
70 (contending that Dirks recognized that “selective disclosure can benefit investors and 
capital markets by ferreting out fraud . . . or by encouraging investor monitoring and 
moving capital market prices to reflect more accurately underlying corporate values”).  
 41. See Selective Disclosure Release, supra note 34, at 83,677 (stating that “the practice of 
selective disclosure leads to a loss of investor confidence in the integrity of our capital 
markets”); Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 42,259 
[1999–2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,228, at 82,849 & n. 19 (Dec. 20, 
1999) (discussing ways in which selective disclosure impairs market efficiency). 
 42. Cf. Jill Fisch, Regulation FD: An Alternative Approach to Addressing Information Asymmetry, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 112, 125 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., 2013) 
(concluding that the “mixed results” from extensive empirical studies make it difficult 
“to draw definitive conclusions about the effects of the Regulation”).  
 43. Compare Macey, supra note 39, at 70 (contending that insiders often tip for “benign” 
reasons that do not benefit the insiders but rather further the interests of the company 
whose confidential information is disclosed), with Nagy, supra note 25, at 55-58 
(emphasizing state court decisions that construe breaches of the duty of loyalty to 
encompass not only self-dealing but also other conduct evidencing a failure of act in 
good faith, such as “where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive 
law” (quoting Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (citation omitted)).  
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loyalty “by causing the corporation to violate the positive laws that it is 
obligated to obey.”44  
To be sure, because the investment banker/tipper at Citigroup was not an 
official acting on behalf of a securities issuer, Regulation FD relates only 
indirectly to the Salman petitioner’s claim that gratuitous tipping does not 
support a conviction for securities fraud under Dirks. But because the Second 
Circuit in Newman sought to facilitate efforts by securities analysts and other 
market professionals to gather and use informational advantages in their 
securities trading,45 our respective views concerning selective disclosure inform 
our opinions about what (if anything) the Court should say regarding the Second 
Circuit’s determination in Newman to heighten the standard for proving a 
personal benefit under Dirks.  
The two initial tippers in Newman were insiders at Dell and NVIDIA, who 
each, on multiple occasions, shared unreleased quarterly earnings information 
with a casual friend.46 For well over a year, the confidential information 
traveled down two multilevel chains of securities analysts that ended with the 
two hedge fund manager defendants.47 Newman held that even if evidence 
establishes that an insider and tippee are friends, the disclosures do not implicate 
joint liability under Rule 10b-5 “in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close 
personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, 
consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly 
valuable nature.” 48  
To varying degrees, Fisch, Pritchard, and Macey would each be satisfied 
with a ruling by the Salman Court that does not disturb Newman’s formulation 
of the personal benefit test and simply reiterates Dirks’s very clear “gift” 
language—which fits to a T the informational tips from the investment banker 
to his family members. But they highlight different reasons for championing 
Newman. Pritchard argues that Rule 10b-5’s proscription against insider trading 
and tipping, as unwritten prohibitions, should be interpreted narrowly because 
they carry criminal consequences and were developed principally through 
adjudication rather than rulemaking or (ideally) legislation.49 Macey lauds the 
 
 44. Nagy, supra note 25, at 57-58 (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 
2003)). See Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934-35 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“The knowing use 
of illegal means to pursue profit for the corporation is director misconduct.”).  
 45. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 449 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 
(2015) (“Efficient capital markets . . . require that persons who acquire and act on 
information about companies be able to profit from the information they generate.” 
(quoting United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 578 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., 
concurring))).  
 46. Id. at 442-43.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 452.  
 49. See generally Pritchard, supra note 30.  
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Newman opinion for recognizing what he regards as selective disclosure’s 
“curative” effects.50 In contrast, Fisch emphasizes the chilling effect that “an 
ambiguous liability standard” has on efforts by analysts and traders to gather and 
use legitimate research.51 She therefore argues that the SEC’s concerns about 
unfair selective disclosure are much better addressed through enforcement 
actions against the issuers and their officials who “give professional traders 
advantages over other investors” in violation of Regulation FD.52  
Langevoort and I, however, would be pleased if the Salman Court issues an 
opinion that disavows Newman’s heightened standard for proving a personal 
benefit. Newman’s focus on tangible benefits has impeded the government’s 
ability to prosecute cases involving corrupt and arrogant disclosures of 
entrusted information to casual friends and business cronies.53 And, by invoking 
Newman, a host of defendants have successfully sought court orders to vacate 
their criminal convictions, guilty pleas, or civil liability judgments.54  
But our preference would be for the Salman Court to reconceptualize insider 
trading law more generally, by establishing a synthesized doctrine of insider 
trading and tipping that better aligns with the jurisprudence that has evolved in 
the nearly twenty years since O’Hagan.55 The approach I have advanced on other 
occasions,56 and that Langevoort considers “the best way to make sense of 
insider trading law,”57 was espoused by Chief Justice Warren Burger in his 
Chiarella dissent, which deemed trading on wrongfully obtained information a 
fraud on contemporaneous traders.58  
 
 50. See Macey, supra note 39, at 68.  
 51. See Jill E. Fisch, Family Ties: Salman and the Scope of Insider Trading, 69 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 46, 48 (2016).  
 52. Id. at 54.  
 53. See Langevoort, supra note 29, at 39 (contending that Newman’s “objective, consequential” 
exchange language “is pernicious in a wide variety of professional settings that involve 
fiduciary disloyalty without any visible return promise”).  
 54. See Patricia Hurtado, Inside Traders Who May Find Hope in Supreme Court Move: List 47 SEC. 
REG & L. REP. 1930, 1930 (Oct. 5, 2015).  
 55. See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA 
L. REV. 1315, 1340-64 (2009) (charting the diminishing importance of fiduciary principles 
in insider trading decisions by lower courts and settled enforcement proceedings).   
 56. See id. at 1373-78; Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider 
Trading Liability: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1296-1304 (1998); see 
also Nagy, supra note 25, at 70 (contending that a new approach is warranted now 
because insider trading jurisprudence has become “unnecessarily complex”).  
 57. See Langevoort, supra note 29, at 44.  
 58. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240-45 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (agreeing 
with the majority’s observation that silence about material facts in business transactions 
is generally permissible absent a fiduciary relationship between the parties, but arguing 
that this general rule “should give way when an informational advantage is obtained, not 
by superior experience, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful means”).  
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Interpreting Rule 10b-5 as the Chief Justice suggested would consolidate the 
Court’s prior classical and misappropriation approaches into a unified 
framework under which the investors who are “harm[ed]”59 and “victim[ized]”60 
by the wrongful use of material nonpublic information are also the parties 
deceived and defrauded. This new theory would thus parallel Section 20A of the 
Exchange Act, which grants an express private right of action to those investors 
trading contemporaneously with an insider-trader.61 A “fraud on 
contemporaneous traders” theory would also prohibit a broader range of 
securities transactions based on material nonpublic information because the 
disclosure obligation would turn not on a relationship of trust and confidence 
but rather on the illicit nature of the informational advantage. The theory, 
therefore, would support liability when information thieves (such as computer 
hackers) trade securities based on market-moving information stolen from its 
rightful owner,62 and, as I have contended, in instances where the recipients of 
repeated selective disclosures trade securities while aware of an insider’s 
deliberate and disloyal violations of Regulation FD.63 Finally, because securities 
trading based on wrongfully obtained information has an “inhibiting impact on 
market participation”64 irrespective of a fiduciary connection, the new theory 
would better advance what O’Hagan identified as the important policy objectives 
of promoting the integrity of and investor confidence in the securities 
markets,65 which in turn enhances market efficiency.66 
If the Court were to endorse this unified and expanded framework, the 
opinion in Salman would mark a monumental development in the law of insider 
trading. But no matter how the Court resolves the issue of gratuitous tipping, 
the spirited debate reflected in this Symposium is bound to continue for a long 
time to come. 
 
 59. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 656 (1997) (observing that a misappropriator 
“deceives the source of the information and simultaneously harms members of the 
investing public”).  
 60. Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1067 (2014) (observing that an insider 
trader’s “victims [are] ‘members of the investing public’ harmed by the defendant’s 
gaining of an ‘advantageous market position’ through insider trading” (quoting O’Hagan, 
521 U.S. at 644, 655)).  
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (2015). 
 62. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009) (questioning whether the defendant’s 
computer hacking constituted active deception or “mere[ly] theft”).  
 63. See Nagy, supra note 25, at 58-60, 65 n.366 (discussing the interplay between state 
fiduciary law and Rule 10b-5, and suggesting revisions to Regulation FD clarifying its 
overlap with Rule 10b-5’s prohibitions of insider trading and tipping).   
 64. See O’Hagan, 451 U.S. at 659.  
 65. See supra text accompanying note 26 (quoting O’Hagan, 451 U.S. at 658). 
 66. See supra note 41 (citing SEC Release proposing Regulation FD).  
